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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This matter is before the court on a petition for a writ of 
mandamus filed by U.S. Healthcare. The plaintiff in the 
underlying action, Donald Eric Hoyt, filed a complaint in 
the Superior Court of New Jersey, which he characterized 
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as an action for "medical malpractice," against U.S. 
Healthcare and various physicians and entities. Prior to any 
of the other defendants being served with a summons and 
complaint in accordance with New Jersey practice, U.S. 
Healthcare removed the matter to the district court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1441(b) and (c) on the ground that 
Hoyt's claims against it arose under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 
S 1101 et seq., so that they were within the district court's 
original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. S 1331. The notice of 
removal asserted that even though Hoyt framed the case as 
a negligence action, it was "removable pursuant to the 
complete preemption exception to the well-pleaded 
complaint rule," citing 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(1)(B) and 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 
1542 (1987). In addition, the notice of removal asserted 
that Hoyt's claims "relate to" an employee benefit plan 
under 29 U.S.C. S 1144, and thus ERISA preempts them. 
After U.S. Healthcare removed the action, it filed cross 
claims against the other defendants and a counterclaim 
against Hoyt advancing subrogation rights under Hoyt's 
employer's ERISA plan which covered Hoyt for medical 
benefits. 
 
Following the removal, the case was assigned to a district 
judge but, in accordance with procedure in the District of 
New Jersey, was assigned further to a magistrate judge for 
pretrial proceedings. The parties, however, did not consent 
to the magistrate judge exercising the jurisdiction of a 
district judge as provided in 28 U.S.C. S 636(c). Neither 
Hoyt nor any other party made a motion to remand the 
case to the state court. Nevertheless, the magistrate judge 
on his own motion on October 17, 1997, remanded the case 
to the Superior Court of New Jersey on the ground that the 
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 
U.S.C. S 1447(c). In remanding the action, the magistrate 
judge clearly regarded the remand order as nondispositive 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 636(b)(1)(A), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), 
and District of New Jersey Local Rule 72.1. As far as we 
can ascertain from the district court docket, the district 
court treated the remand as effective immediately because 
the court closed the case on October 17, 1997, 
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notwithstanding Local Rule 72.1(c)(1)(C) which provides 
that: 
 
       The Clerk shall take no action with respect to a 
       Magistrate Judge's order of remand or for transfer of 
       venue until 15 days from the filing of such an order. In 
       the event that a notice of appeal from such an order is 
       filed within such 15-day period, the Clerk shall take no 
       action until the appeal is decided by the Judge.1 
 
Subsequently, without seeking relief in the district court, 
U.S. Healthcare filed a petition for a writ of mandamus 
requesting that we vacate the order of remand. The 
petition's thrust was that the action could not be remanded 
because no party had made a motion to remand within 30 
days after the filing of the notice of removal as required by 
28 U.S.C. S 1447(c) in the case of a defect in the removal 
procedure. Moreover, U.S. Healthcare claimed that the 
district court had subject matter jurisdiction. Upon 
receiving the petition we ordered the filing of answers and 
subsequently we ordered the parties to submit briefs. 
 
U.S. Healthcare has filed a brief asserting that the 
magistrate judge "did not have the authority to remand this 
case to state court" and that "the district court had subject 
matter jurisdiction over the case at the time it was 
remanded through [its] counterclaim and, as such, the 
magistrate judge's failure to consider this fact was an abuse 
of discretion." Hoyt has not filed a brief in these 
proceedings but certain of the defendants in the underlying 
action have filed a brief asserting that (1) a magistrate 
judge does have the authority to remand a case to a state 
court; (2) 28 U.S.C. S 1447(d) precludes this court from 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. It appears that the district court adopted Local Rule 72.1(c)(1)(C) at 
least in part in response to DeCastro v. Awacs, 940 F. Supp. 692 (D.N.J. 
1996), which held that a magistrate judge could remand a case as a 
nondispositive order and that, notwithstanding 28 U.S.C. S 1447(d), a 
district court may hear an appeal from a remand order under 28 U.S.C. 
S 636(b)(1)(A), but that under Hunt v. Acromed Corp., 961 F.2d 1079 (3d 
Cir. 1992), once the court sends a certified copy of the remand order to 
the state court the district court could not review the remand decision. 
See also Campbell v. International Bus. Machs., 912 F. Supp. 116 (D.N.J. 
1996). 
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reviewing the order of remand on the merits; and (3) 28 
U.S.C. S 636(b)(1)(A) afforded U.S. Healthcare a mechanism 
to appeal the remand order to the district court so that U.S. 
Healthcare cannot obtain mandamus relief.2  
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
Initially we consider whether we should characterize the 
order of remand as dispositive or nondispositive inasmuch 
as 28 U.S.C. SS 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) draw a sharp 
distinction between dispositive and nondispositive matters 
in determining a magistrate judge's powers.3 28 U.S.C. 
S 636(b)(1)(A) provides that a magistrate judge may "hear 
and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, 
except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the 
pleadings, for summary judgment, . . . to dismiss or to 
permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to 
involuntarily dismiss an action." Thus, in general, a 
magistrate judge, without the consent of the parties, has 
the power to enter orders which do not dispose of the case. 
The district court may reconsider any pretrial matter 
"where it has been shown that the magistrate judge's order 
is clearly erroneous or contrary to law." A magistrate judge, 
without the consent of the parties, may "conduct hearings, 
including evidentiary hearings and . . . submit to a judge of 
the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations 
for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of any" of the 
dispositive motions we described above. 
 
It is clear that 28 U.S.C. S 636(b)(1)(A) does not in terms 
preclude a magistrate judge from hearing and determining 
a motion to remand a case to a state court. Nevertheless, 
because a remand order is dispositive insofar as 
proceedings in the federal court are concerned, the order is 
the functional equivalent of an order of dismissal for 
purposes of that section. While we recognize that after a 
remand a case may go forward in the state court, still the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Hoyt filed a letter joining in the opposition of the participating 
respondents to the granting of the petition. 
 
3. Of course, we deal with a situation in which the magistrate judge 
cannot exercise consent jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 636(c). 
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order for remand conclusively terminates the matter in the 
federal court against the will of the party who removed the 
case. 
 
In considering this issue we point out that we must take 
into account "the potential for Art. III constraints in 
permitting a magistrate to make decisions on dispositive 
motions." United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676, 100 
S.Ct. 2406, 2412 (1980). Thus, in NLRB v. Frazier, 966 
F.3d 812, 816 (3d Cir. 1992), in discussing 28 U.S.C. 
S 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) we indicated that the statute: 
 
       distinguishes between regular pretrial matters, which a 
       magistrate judge may decide, and those dispositive 
       matters which have a preclusive effect on the parties, 
       about which the magistrate judge may only make a 
       recommendation to the court. Congress crafted this 
       distinction to assure that Article III judges retain the 
       ultimate adjudicatory power over dispositive motions. 
 
An order of remand simply cannot be characterized as 
nondispositive as it preclusively determines the important 
point that there will not be a federal forum available to 
entertain a particular dispute. In our view, a magistrate 
judge may not, without the consent of the parties, decide 
this critical issue at the core of the exercise of federal 
judicial power. 
 
In determining this case it is helpful to consider a 
situation in which a plaintiff files parallel federal and state 
actions seeking relief for the same alleged loss. We do not 
think that anyone would argue seriously that a magistrate 
judge, without consent of the parties, could hear and 
determine a motion to dismiss the federal action, predicated 
on an absence of subject matter jurisdiction, on the theory 
that the motion is nondispositive because a parallel action 
is pending in the state court.4 Yet in a practical sense an 
order of remand predicated on a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction is no less dispositive than an order of dismissal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The situation we describe is not fanciful for experience shows that 
sometimes plaintiffs do initiate parallel federal and state actions. See, 
e.g., Mints v. Educational Testing Serv., 99 F.3d 1253, 1255 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
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in the circumstances we describe as both orders have the 
exact same effect by permitting the case to proceed in the 
state rather than the federal court. In sum, we believe that 
even if it could do so, Congress never intended to vest the 
power in a non-Article III judge to determine the 
fundamental question of whether a case could proceed in a 
federal court. 
 
In reaching our result we recognize that while neither the 
Supreme Court nor any court of appeals of which we are 
aware has addressed the issue before us, the district court 
in DeCastro v. Awacs, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 692, 695 (D.N.J. 
1996) (citations omitted), surveyed district court cases and 
concluded that "the vast majority of the district courts, 
within [the District of New Jersey] and elsewhere, that have 
confronted this issue, have held that a motion to remand is 
`non-dispositive,' and therefore, can be determined by a 
magistrate judge by final order in accordance with 28 
U.S.C. S 636(b)(1)(A)." The DeCastro court in joining that 
majority pointed out that remand orders "are not among 
those [pretrial] orders specifically enumerated in 28 U.S.C. 
S 636(b)(1)(A) that a magistrate judge is without the 
authority to issue." DeCastro, 940 F. Supp. at 695. The 
court also noted that Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) indicates that a 
nondispositive matter is "not dispositive of a claim or 
defense of a party." The DeCastro court indicated that a 
remand order does not dispose of a claim or defense as it 
merely transfers the case. 
 
We certainly do not suggest that the district court cases 
DeCastro cited had no basis for their conclusion. 
Nevertheless we reject their conclusion because it is clear 
that as far as the federal courts are concerned, a remand 
order is dispositive of all the claims and defenses in the 
case as it banishes the entire case from the federal court. 
Moreover, a federal court is not concerned with the 
proceedings that follow a remand. Furthermore, as we 
observed above, an order of remand is no less dispositive 
than a dismissal order of a federal action for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction where a parallel proceeding is pending 
in the state court. 
 
Our conclusion that a remand order is dispositive for 
purposes of 28 U.S.C. S 636(b)(1) brings us to the two other 
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issues implicated in these proceedings: (1) whether 28 
U.S.C. S 1447(d) precludes us from granting relief; and (2) 
whether U.S. Healthcare had an adequate remedy by a 
procedure other than through mandamus. See In re 
Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d 214, 226 (3d Cir. 1998). If we 
answer either question affirmatively we must deny the 
petition. 
 
With an exception not applicable here, 28 U.S.C. 
S 1447(d) provides that an "order remanding a case to the 
State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on 
appeal or otherwise." We observed recently that while "this 
bar to the reviewability of remand orders appears broad 
and unyielding, the courts have carved various exceptions 
from it and therefore will review certain remand orders." 
Feidt v. Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp., ___ F.3d ___, 1998 
WL 525440, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 24, 1998). In the leading 
case of Thermtron Prods. Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 
336, 346, 96 S.Ct. 584, 590 (1976), the Supreme Court 
made it clear that only "remand orders issued under [28 
U.S.C. S 1447(c)] and invoking the grounds specified therein 
. . . are immune from review under S 1447(d)." It seems 
evident that if an order of a district judge remanding a case 
is not insulated from review unless issued for a reason set 
forth in section 1447(c), i.e., a defect in removal procedure 
or a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, then an order of a 
magistrate judge that could not be issued pursuant to 
section 1447(c) because of the magistrate judge's lack of 
authority to issue it, is not insulated from review by section 
1447(d). In the circumstances, we see no need to discuss 
this point further as it is clear that section 1447(d) is not 
a bar to U.S. Healthcare's petition. 
 
Finally, we conclude that U.S. Healthcare has no realistic 
remedy other than to seek a writ of mandamus in this 
court under 28 U.S.C. S 1651. See Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. 
v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 461 (3d Cir. 1996). We recognize 
that 28 U.S.C. S 636(b)(1)(A) provides that a "judge of the 
[district] court may reconsider any pretrial matter under 
this subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that the 
magistrate's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law." 
The inadequacy of this provision in the context here is clear 
in view of Local Rule 72.1(c)(1)(C) for it seems unlikely that 
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the district court would have granted relief on the ground 
that the magistrate judge did not have jurisdiction to issue 
an order of remand. After all, to do so it would have had to 
recognize, as we plainly do, that Local Rule 72.1(c)(1)(C) is 
invalid insofar as it deals with orders of remand. Thus, in 
this case it cannot be said that mandamus is being used as 
a substitute for appeal. In the circumstances, we conclude 
that we should issue the writ of mandamus.5 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons we will order that a writ of 
mandamus be issued to the magistrate judge, directing him 
to vacate the order of October 17, 1997, remanding the 
case to the Superior Court of New Jersey. Of course, we 
express no view on whether the district court has subject 
matter jurisdiction in this case and thus our opinion does 
not preclude the district court from remanding the case if 
it should find that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The 
parties will bear their own costs in these proceedings. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The district court docket sheets in the underlying case show that the 
file was closed on October 17, 1997, but they do not indicate that the 
clerk of the court sent a certified copy of the order of remand to the 
state 
court. Thus, we are not concerned with the jurisdictional rule of Hunt v. 
Acromed Corp., 961 F.2d 1079 (3d Cir. 1992), that once the district court 
sends a certified copy of the remand order to the state court it loses 
jurisdiction. See also Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 217, 
225 (3d Cir. 1995). Of course, we would not in any event hold that the 
sending a certified copy of a remand order executed by a judicial officer 
without power to issue the order would place the order beyond judicial 
review. 
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